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Abstract
In this paper, a testing method suitable for strengthening fault tolerance in the
event of unexpected situations within a software system is presented. It is based on
the idea of testing an integrated system, by substituting system components with
other, similar in design and functionality that operate in an erroneous and even
malicious manner. The approach adopted, is similar to the concept of inserting a
virus within an organization so that the defense mechanisms of the latter can be
tested and the necessary lines of defense are formed, so that the virus cannot aﬀect
any of the organization critical parts. The focal point is to ensure that in case of
a module malfunction, the integrated system will continue to operate, isolating the
malfunctioning software at the greatest possible extend, preventing the erroneous
behavior from aﬀecting other (and sometimes critical) modules. The testing method
proposed is based ﬁrst on isolated components testing adopting and enhancing the
Component Oﬀ The Self method, and second on integrated system testing using
malicious components that emulate erroneous operation.
Keywords: Component testing, Integrated system testing, Regression testing,
COTS.
1 Introduction
In this paper, a method for providing a testing scheme suitable for strength-
ening fault tolerance in the event of unexpected situations within a software
system is presented. As fault tolerance, we deﬁne the ability of software to
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tested component inputs. Hence, the ﬁnal system will encompass the ability
to locate malicious states that may endanger its operation. Furthermore, the
testing scheme targets at ensuring that even if the error occurred has not been
anticipated, the eﬀect caused will be confronted in the system internal inter-
faces between the components, deterring the damaging consequences [1,2,3].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we provide
a description of past work on component testing and the advantages and
disadvantages that these methods have. In the following section, the Malicious
Code Testing method is presented. This presentation consists of the following
parts. The ﬁrst is the description of the method principles and the structures
used for the deployment of the method. Next, the two phases of the method
and testing algorithm used are explained. The next section of the paper
provides an example of using the method for testing a simple routine. The ﬁnal
section provides conclusions on the use of the proposed method and presents
the way it deals with the weaknesses of other component based methods, while
it displays and some ideas for future work.
2 Past work based on component testing
Testing approaches presented in the past have always focused in confronting
erroneous situations based on testing over improbable (but anticipated) events
[1,2,4]. A characteristic example is the Components Oﬀ The Self (COTS) [5,6]
methodology. These algorithms deal with component interface testing limited
on components incorporated in the system, without any knowledge about
their internal functionality, relying solely on information given either from the
components vendor or the system’s integrator. This information consists of
component’s speciﬁcations and scenarios to introduce the system in failure
situations.
The COTS algorithms perform testing based on fault injection, data col-
lection techniques and machine learning algorithms. In order to identify
system component anomalous behavior, COTS algorithms described in ap-
proaches [5,6], provide a wrapper that controls the inputs and outputs of the
component’s interfaces. This wrapper has a signiﬁcant impact over the tested
software in terms of size and complexity. Furthermore, each of the above ap-
proaches requires additional eﬀort in order, ﬁrst to deﬁne the component’s
exact functionality and second to determine its behaviour. It should also be
noted that since the above algorithms follow a staged approach in which each
testing stage is initiated upon provision of the related input types from the
integrator (and is limited to these types), the time schedule of the testing is
prone to delays appearing in the interval between the completion of a stage
and the provision of the inputs for the next. Moreover, the tests are focussing
only on faulty inputs and outputs of the component, based on the assump-
tion that a faulty output is caused only by a faulty input. In this way, there
is no provision for tests related to abnormal functionality caused by internal
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component errors (which may appear even in the cases of valid inputs). In
these cases, since the illegal output is not directly related to the input, the
aforementioned COTS testing methods may fail in locating the error.
Another major issue is that COTS algorithms do not provide any kind
of regression testing. Regression testing is ”the selective re-testing of a sys-
tem or component to verify that modiﬁcations have not caused unintended
eﬀects” [7]. Therefore, it helps reducing the overall eﬀort by assisting the
debugging process in correcting the errors faster and more eﬃciently. COTS
algorithms, by simply reporting the behaviour of tested components accord-
ing to speciﬁc input lists, do not provide the means for advancing to the next
step required for regression testing, being the identiﬁcation of the erroneous
behaviour through the reporting of faulty functionality in combination with
the related data.
Coming now to the issue of equitable operation and system evaluation in
terms of acceptance testing decision, in the case of COTS methods this is
entailed only as an aggregate on the volume of the passed/failed tests of the
individual system components. Since each component is tested separately,
the reports produced are reﬂecting the results of isolated component testing,
ignoring cases of side eﬀects or interferences such as the one mentioned earlier
in the example of faulty variable deﬁnition. Such an approach is overlook-
ing the side eﬀects that a component’s faulty operation may introduce in an
integrated system.
Finally, the COTS methods, through the production of test reports sim-
ply as a feedback to speciﬁc test list provided by the component’s integrator,
they actually discard any knowledge acquired through the testing procedure.
Such a knowledge, being for example new faulty outputs, not previously an-
ticipated, could be used in future tests as new inputs in order to provide a
more comprehensive testing framework.
3 The Malicious Component Insertion (MCI) method
The method is based on the idea of testing an integrated system, by substi-
tuting system components with other, similar in design and functionality that
operate in an erroneous and even malicious manner. Hence, it is named Mali-
cious Component Insertion (MCI) method. The prototype and the malicious
component have the exact same behavior in terms of operation and interfaces.
The diﬀerence is that the malicious component is producing only invalid and
erroneous outputs on the same interfaces as the prototype.
The method combines individual component and overall system testing. To
support it, a structure for organizing the necessary tests which generate error
messages or exceptions is used. These types can be constraints that the devel-
opment team should have predeﬁned during system design and development.
For example, using techniques such as the Boundary Value Analysis and the
Equivalence Partitioning [8], the developer of the system will be able to intro-
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duce some values to the speciﬁc list. The list is expected to contain standard
entries which will be enriched with test types produced as feedback from tests
performed using the MCI method, as it will be explained later. The advantage
of the proposed approach lies in the fact that the erroneous inputs-outputs
are inserted in a Test Type List (TTL) which holds all test types expected
to generate error messages or exceptions. The speciﬁc list can be used for
the production of test scripts for similar systems due to the resemblance in
characteristics of the listed attributes. This list can also be used for regression
testing. Since speciﬁc inputs cause speciﬁc failures, the proposed method is
able to collect these data and reduce the eﬀort needed in case of erroneous
component’s behaviour.
Although software testing focuses on ensuring that software accomplishes the
speciﬁed function correctly, the idea presented in this paper goes far beyond
than that. The focal point is to ensure that the software continues to op-
erate correctly even in of the presence of unusual systemevents or malicious
attacks [9]. The scheme proposed uses fault injection analysis [10,11] to de-
termine the eﬀect of unusual behavior of the software. This is possible by
deploying a process of corrupting a data state during program execution and
evaluating the eﬀect of that corruption. The analysis may comprise of simple
measurements that clarify whether the corrupted state aﬀected a particular
output or advance even further by determining whether system attributes such
as safety, security, or survivability have been aﬀected [12].
A two phased approach
The MCI method is based on a two phased approach, in order to provide
the necessary functionality for both individual (component oriented) and in-
tegrated (system oriented) testing. Through this approach, overall system
testing is achieved through a process of comprehensive tests over each indi-
vidual component, building the framework for integrated testing. The two
phases are complementary since the output of each phase is provided as feed-
back to the other.
In the ﬁrst phase, similarly to the COTS testing approach [5], all system com-
ponents are identiﬁed as unique and independent modules that can be sepa-
rately tested. For the needs of the method, a classiﬁcation of two symmetric
entities is made. The ﬁrst entity types are deﬁned as ”positive” components.
These are the individual components that comprise the system. Each of these
is expected to provide the actual and predeﬁned set of outputs that are de-
signed to, during the tests performed in phase 1. The ”positive”, under test
component is placed in an isolated environment and its interfaces are ”feed”
with erroneous inputs in order to evaluate its behavior. The second entity
types are deﬁned as ”negative” components. These are the symmetric compo-
nents that during the phase 2 tests are expected to produce all the erroneous
outputs tested as inputs at phase 1. These outputs can be produced by using
custom built code performing the fault injection technique. Negative com-
ponents have a one to one relationship with the corresponding positive ones.
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They are formed right after the successful completion of a test on a positive
component, have the same interfaces, but their operational role is to produce
all sorts of illegal or ”unexpected” outputs. By this, the process of substitut-
ing a positive component with a negative provides a valuable tool in order to
test how the integrated application reacts in erroneous situations created by
illegal or unpredicted outputs of application sub-components.
After the successful completion of phase 1, all the positive components have
been tested and the negative components have been clearly identiﬁed. From
this point, phase 2 can start. During this phase, the integrated system will
be tested by substituting all positive components (one at a time) with the
corresponding negative ones. By this, the system behaviour is evaluated and
all the eﬀects on the component interfaces and side eﬀects are reported in
order to be resolved. We must note that since the model targets at testing
and discovering the possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the integrated
system, phase 2 may be interrupted whenever the report statistics indicate
that the system is not adequately robust, in order to perform all the neces-
sary modiﬁcations, and the testing process can start again from phase 1.
The method is based on the use of a component testing algorithm described
in the following paragraphs of the paper. This algorithm provides the logic
used in order to perform full tests both on component and on system level.
To test each component of the system, the testing algorithm uses an Interface
Testing Routine, applied to each of the system components described later in
the paper.
Component Testing Algorithm
As it has been described, the algorithm is based on the use of positive and
negative components that bear a one to one relationship with each other. Ac-
cordingly, two lists are used in order to store these components during the
execution of the algorithm. The ﬁrst list contains all the system components.
It is the Positive Components List (PCL). Each component is inserted in the
list during the initialization procedure, and is extracted from the list once
the testing procedure for this component is successfully terminated. Sym-
metrically to this list, a second list named Negative Component List (NCL)
is used. This list holds all the ”negative” components of the system. Simi-
larly to the procedures used for the management of the PCL, each negative
component is inserted in the NCL once this component is formed based on
the corresponding positive component, and is extracted later, once the testing
procedure using this negative component has been terminated. Finally, a spe-
cial list called Test Type List (TTL) is used to hold the test types expected
to generate error messages or exceptions. This list is constantly updated from
the reports produced during diﬀerent system tests and is used as an evolving
global testing library.
As mentioned previously, the algorithm is based on a two phase approach.
The ﬁrst is based on standard component testing and is used for setting up
the environment for the execution of the second phase, in which overall sys-
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tem testing will be performed based on the insertion of negative (malicious)
components.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the two phases of the MCI method.
Fig. 1. MCI method test phases
The logic used for testing during phase 1, is presented in the following.
Phase 1: Component testing and negative component creation.
The ﬁrst phase is starting with the deﬁnition of all individual system com-
ponents. The scope of this action is to fully and individually describe each
of the system’s components in order to be tested separately in the following
steps of process. Once all the components have been identiﬁed as unique and
individual entities, they are inserted sequentially in the PCL and the testing
process is initiated. This process relies on a loop that examines if the PCL
is empty. If the list is not empty, then the next system component of the
PCL is tested. During the testing, each interface of the examined component
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will be tested under the eﬀect of erroneous inputs. As erroneous inputs we
deﬁne those inputs that are unexpected to occur, yet they must be protected
against [4]. The utility of such inputs is to ensure that the tested system
component does not malfunction. If the testing fails, a report is generated
informing the user that the component under test failed to operate correctly.
The process proceeds by selecting the next positive component for test. If the
test is successful, the component’s ”negative model” is deﬁned. The ”nega-
tive” model is now inserted in the NCL, while the next positive component is
extracted from the PCL.
The above loop is executed until the PCL is empty, meaning that the NCL
now contains all the negatives components that can be used from the next
stage of the algorithm to test the overall system behavior. At this point, the
algorithm has tested all system components and can guarantee safe operation
of each one individually. However, the most important result is the deﬁnition
of the negative components that can now be used during the second ”malicious
testing” phase, in which the overall system performance and stability will be
subjected to excessive testing.
The logic used for testing during phase 2, is presented in the following.
Phase 2: Overall system testing.
The second phase starts with the formation of an integrated system that will
be tested according to the following procedure. Each negative model will re-
place its related positive, in order to test the overall system behavior. Each
replacement will take place in each of the process iterations. This process relies
on a loop that examines if the NCL is empty. If it is not, then the ﬁrst neg-
ative component is extracted from the list and substitutes the correspondent
positive component within the system. After that, the system tests begin.
During the testing period, the negative component produces all the erroneous
outputs that the corresponding positive component would never present, if
functioning in default conditions.
The objective is to check the reaction of the system in case one of the system
components presents a malfunction, and to determine the eﬀect this will have
on the operation of the system components to which it interacts. If the testing
is successful, the next component is replaced by its reverse model. If not, the
components that failed to operate correctly are identiﬁed and the behavior
of the system is recorded. The process checks for any new kind of test types
among the test results. The new test types may derive from the produced
outputs of the failed component. Upon appearance of a new test type, this is
considered a possible entry in the TTL, and if the evaluation of this new test
type concludes that it is not covered by existing entries in the TTL, then it
is inserted in the list. Following, the components that failed to operate are
inserted in the PCL in order to be re-tested with the inputs that cause their
failure and their reverse models are extracted from the NCL.
The above loop is executed until the NCL is empty. At this point, the algo-
rithm has tested the system by using all the available negative components,
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and the results of the tests have been recorded. The produced reports are
a very important result of this process. They can be used to provide useful
information for the debugging procedure because they can spot the part of
the system that failed to operate correctly. Another advantage provided by
these reports is the assistance in deﬁnition of the regression testing strategy.
Given the failed component, the associated ones along with the inputs that
cause the failure, the tester is able to focus his testing eﬀort in the speciﬁc
problematic area.
Interface Testing Routine
The routine is based on the use of component interfaces and test types. Two
lists are deployed for storing and retrieving these resources during the execu-
tion of the algorithm. The ﬁrst list contains all the component interfaces. It
is the component interfaces list (CIL). Each interface is extracted from the
list once its testing is started. The second list consists of all speciﬁc test types
that are related to speciﬁc interfaces. This list is the Interface Test List (ITL).
ITL is a sub-list of the TTL because it refers on speciﬁc component interfaces.
According to the above, the ﬁrst step of the routine is the identiﬁcation of
all the individual component interfaces. The scope of this action is to isolate
each of the interfaces in order to be tested separately in the following steps of
the process. Once all the component interfaces have been identiﬁed, they are
inserted in the CIL. Following, the testing process is initiated based on a loop
that examines if the CIL list is empty. If it is not empty, the test types for the
speciﬁc interface are identiﬁed and are inserted in the ITL. In case of all the
available test types for the speciﬁc interface have been performed, the next
available interface is extracted from CIL and it is selected to be tested. In the
opposite case, the next test type is extracted from ITL, in order to be used
as input to the speciﬁc interface. This loop is executed until all the test types
of ITL entry have been performed to the selected interface. If the interface
functions correctly, the process proceeds with the next interface found in the
CIL. Else, the results are recorded.
The loop is executed until the CIL is empty, meaning that the testing of
the speciﬁc system component has ended and the testing of the next one has
started. The results of this execution are test reports describing the evaluation
of the failed component interfaces. Given the interface that failed to operate
correctly and the directly associated interfaces, the testing eﬀort in the next
iteration of the algorithm is reduced since the tester can focus only in this
problematic area.
4 Method use example
In order to explain the use of the MCI method in practice, a small example
will be presented, based on the implementation of a routine for the calculation
of the roots of the following equation: ”ax2 + bx +c = 0” using the method
of the discriminant. The routine provides an interface for getting user inputs
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(being the parameters of the equation), performs the necessary calculations,
and displays the result of the discriminant and the roots of the equation, or
reports an error message in case the above calculations cannot be performed.
The routine consists of three sub-routines. The ﬁrst sub-routine is the action-
Performed( ) which is the component that read user’s entries and calculates
the discriminant. The second sub-routine is the calcRoot1( ) which is the
component that calculates the ﬁrst root of the equation and the third one is
the calcRoot2( ) which is the component that calculates the second root of
the equation.
The routine will now be tested using the MCI method. First, each of the three
distinct components of the routine will be isolated in order to be tested sep-
arately. The components are inserted in the PCL, and the ﬁrst testing phase
starts with the tests on actionPerformed( ). The failed tests are reported,
the necessary corrections are made, and the testing procedure is repeated un-
til the tests are successful. At this point we proceed with the deﬁnition of
the negative component, named as N(actionPerformed( )). The testing pro-
cedure will be repeated according to the model’s algorithm for components
calcRoot1( ) and calcRoot2( ). Once the tests are successful, the N(calcRoot1(
)) and N(calcRoot2( )) negative components will be placed in the NCL. The
component actionPerformed( ) will be substituted ﬁrst. For the needs of the
testing, we perform all tests provided from the ITL. The entries of the ITL list
in case of the actionPerformed( ) component appear in Table 1. The negative
model of the component is incorporated into the system in order to provide
erroneous outputs and the system’s reaction to these outputs is recorded. The
list of outputs consists of two test types categories. The ﬁrst category consists
of the test types initially deﬁned according to the rules described above (i.e.
Boundary Value Analysis, Equivalence Partitioning [8]). The second category
consists of the outputs produced from the test from the ﬁrst phase. In this
way we achieve an increment on the number of the test cases performed. The
outputs provided by the negative model appear in Table 2. We can detect two
major advantages of this approach. First, the test cases are increased creating
the tendency for more exhaustive testing, and second, this set of input/output
can be used in regression testing of the failed (as well as the interacting) com-
ponents after all the appropriate modiﬁcations have been made.
19
Patrikakis, Kalamaris and Kakavas
ID Corresponding ITL entry
1 Numerical inputs (integer)
2 Numerical inputs (real)
3 Inputs leading to special conditions (discriminant< 0)
4 Inputs leading to special conditions (discriminant=0)
5 Character inputs
6 Combination of Character and null inputs
7 Special Character inputs
Table 1: MCI Test Results
ID Corresponding ITL entry Second Category
1 Special characters
2 Null outputs
Table 2: MCI Test Results
5 Conclusions and future extensions to the model
In this paper we have discussed about a model that combines individual com-
ponent and overall system testing. This approach, adopts the techniques pro-
posed by the COTS algorithms, in order to build a solid testing framework in
which vulnerabilities can be tested not only in terms of individual components,
but also in the context of an integrated system, covering component interac-
tions and side-eﬀects. In this way, it aims at confronting all the weak points of
the COTS algorithms presented earlier in the paper. In details, the limitation
posed by an input driven testing list provided by the component integrator, is
lifted by the formation of a knowledge base constantly updated by the testing
results, used to provide feedback for future tests. Therefore, the tests are not
limited by the knowledge provided by the integrator about the system under
test, but are gradually enriched by embodying information acquired gradually
from diﬀerent testing iterations. Additionally, COTS algorithms provide test
reports containing the erroneous inputs/outputs and the component’s deviant
actions. The MCI method makes a step forward, using the data provided
from the test reports in order to perform regression testing, decreasing the
required time during the debugging procedure. Regarding system evaluation
in terms of acceptance testing decision, in the case of COTS methods, this is
entailed only as an aggregate on the volume of the passed/failed tests of the
individual system components. In our approach the evaluation of the system
is a combination of component’s and overall system performance. Currently
we are working towards the modeling of the MCI method, in order to create a
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management system that will administrate the testing approach. We also plan
to implement a warning mechanism deploying diﬀerent levels of alarms issued
upon insertion of a new entry to the TTL. These alarms will be used as risk
assessment indicators of the system under the eﬀect of erroneous inputs, to
provide quality metrics capable of displaying the level of system vulnerability.
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